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GLD-290        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2870 
 ___________ 
 
RONALD JOSEPH PAYNE, 




SUPERINTENDENT PITKINS; DR. SALAME; DR. ROBINSON 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00128) 
 Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 15, 2011 
 
 Before:   AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 Ronald Joseph Payne, an inmate in Pennsylvania, filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 seeking damages based on a claim that, while working in the kitchen at SCI-Laurel 
Highlands, he broke his arm in a slip-and-fall accident and did not receive proper 
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treatment until five months later.  The named defendants (Superintendent Pitkins, and 
Drs. Robinson and Salameh
1
) moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Payne failed to 
properly exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a).  In particular, defendants pointed out that Payne was injured on May 17, 2008, 
but he did not file a grievance until September 8, 2009, and while Payne had surgery on 
his arm on October 17, 2008, his grievance was filed almost a year after the surgery.  The 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) rejected Payne’s grievance as untimely, explaining 
that “[t]he issue … describe[d] concerning a broken arm happened in 2008. It is well past 
the 15 day time frame for filing a grievance.”  Payne argued in response to the motions to 
dismiss that he had been denied his property for sixty days and denied access to the 
commissary for two weeks, suggesting that he was prevented from commencing the 
grievance process in a timely manner.  
 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motions to dismiss be granted, 
explaining that even if Payne’s obligation to file a grievance was not triggered until after 
his surgery, the grievance was submitted nearly eleven months after expiration of the 
fifteen-day deadline.  In addition, Payne did not appeal the rejection of his grievance, and 
the Magistrate Judge concluded Payne’s procedural default in the administrative review 
process bars his claim from being heard in federal court.  Finally, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that equitable tolling would not render Payne’s grievance timely filed or 
excuse his failure to appeal.   
 After issuance of the Report and Recommendation, to which Payne filed no 
                                                 
1
 Dr. Salameh is misidentified in the caption as “Dr. Salame.” 
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objections, the parties consented in writing to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge, 
who thereafter adopted the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the court and 
dismissed the complaint.  Payne timely filed this appeal. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the 
dismissal of a prisoner civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003).  Because Payne is 
proceeding in forma pauperis, we must dismiss his appeal if, inter alia, we determine that 
the appeal is frivolous.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  
 After a review of the record, we discern no error in the Magistrate Judge’s 
analysis.  The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title by a prisoner 
confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 
are available are exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 
(2006), the Supreme Court held that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper 
exhaustion.”  Id. at 93 (emphasis added); see Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 
2004) (explaining that the PLRA includes a procedural default component and that the 
determination whether a prisoner properly exhausted a claim is made by evaluating 
compliance with the prison’s specific grievance procedures).   
 The record here is undisputed that Payne filed a grievance regarding his broken 
arm and the alleged delay in treatment on September 8, 2009.  The DOC rejected the 
grievance as untimely filed – a determination that was undoubtedly correct regardless of 
whether the fifteen-day period for filing is measured from the date of Payne’s injury or 
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the date of his subsequent surgery.  Payne did not appeal the denial of his grievance.  His 
argument for tolling or extending the time to file a grievance based on a lack of access to 
materials or a commissary for short periods of time cannot, as the Magistrate Judge fully 
explained, remedy the gross untimeliness of his grievance.  Even under a most favorable 
reading of the record, Payne filed his grievance several months too late. 
 “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 
critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without 
imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”  Woodford, 548 U.S. 
at 90-91.  Consequently, an “untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative 
grievance or appeal” is insufficient to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Id. at 
83; see Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230.  Applying these principles, the Magistrate Judge 
correctly held that Payne failed to properly exhaust the claim that he raises in this suit, 
and, accordingly, properly dismissed the complaint.   
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal lacks any arguable legal merit, and 
we will dismiss it as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  
